This paper studies the financing costs of affordable housing arising from the policy interaction between the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. Large banks provide 85 percent of equity investment in the LIHTC market, motivated by CRA incentives. However, CRA evaluations tie banks’ investment to their local deposit footprints, which creates spatially fragmented demand for tax credits. I assemble a novel dataset that unpacks the capital stack and development costs of LIHTC projects obtained through FOIA requests. Using bank mergers and acquisitions as exogenous shocks to local CRA demand, I find that increases in bank deposits significantly raise LIHTC investment in affected counties. Tax credit prices are higher where banks have stronger CRA incentives, while syndication further depresses prices in thin-deposit counties. Markets with lower tax credit prices see less entry and smaller projects. To quantify the efficiency consequences, I develop and estimate a structural model of affordable housing supply and tax credit demand. Counterfactual simulations show that removing the spatial constraints embedded in CRA incentives, as proposed in the 2023 CRA modernization, would equalize developers’ financing costs, reallocate equity across space, reduce syndication costs, increase affordable housing supply and improve the efficiency of the LIHTC program.

This paper studies how condominium associations and cooperative boards (HOAs) shape residential sorting and racial segregation in New York City. Using novel textual data on HOA screening policies, I construct a building-level measure of HOA stringency and find that minority buyers are less likely than white buyers to purchase units with more stringent policies, conditional on affordability. Minorities who do buy in face tougher financial hurdles, often purchasing with cash or higher income. These racial disparities can be traced back to historical redlining. A residential location choice model reveal that stringent policies intensify income sorting, disproportionately burdening minority buyers.

Price filters on digital platforms can shape search in decentralized asset markets by determining which buyers encounter which assets. Using more than two million North American housing listings, we show that homes priced just below salient round-number thresholds are less likely to sell, transact at lower prices, and remain on the market longer than adjacent round-priced homes. These discontinuities are significantly larger at thresholds embedded in realtor.com search menus. Linked buyer-survey evidence shows weaker bidder competition and lower-budget buyers at odd-priced listings. The results show how platform search design affects market exposure, liquidity, and price formation.